The paper proposes an original strategy to analyze household sharing of income and satisfaction. Using two different subjective questions of the Russian data RLMS (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey), we assume a correspondence between, first, the perception of income that household members report and their true income sharing, and, second, between their answer to a satisfaction question and their utility. We show that the answers given by different members of the household bring pertinent information on income sharing and utility in the household. In particular, we find a significant effect of the female-male wage ratio in reported income perception and satisfaction differentials between household members. Given that the available data covers the transition period (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003) characterized by massive economic and social changes in Russia, we investigate the dynamics of household behavior.
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to show that subjective data can be used to test directly some of the assumptions made in non-unitary models of the household. Non-unitary models share a common view of decision-making within the household, where final allocations, i.e. consumption and labor supply of household members, depend on their "bargaining power". This is true whether the decision-making process can be represented by a cooperative game (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) , by a non cooperative game (Bergström, 1997; Chen and Woolley, 2001; Lommerud, 1995 and 2000; Lundberg et al., 1997; Udry, 1996; Ulph, 2006) , or is only assumed to be Paretooptimal, as in collective models (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori, 1988 and 1992; Moreau and Donni, 2002) .
Starting with non-unitary approach, we introduce two concepts defining intrahousehold equality. Our strategy consists in using subjective data to infer household sharing of income and satisfaction and applying probit-type model accounting for discrete unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical findings refute the unitary model hypothesis regarding income pooling at the household level and support the assumptions made by bargaining models. In particular, we show that relative wages and age difference of spouses impact the sharing of income and utility 1 .
The intra household welfare distribution is analyzed in its dynamics during the transitional period in Russia. The economic transition from a centrally planned system to a market economy introduced since 1992 led to dramatic changes in the Russian economy and was accompanied by a considerable fall in individual and household incomes (Mikhalev, 1998) . According to official data (Goskomstat, 2000) , during the period 1991 -1999, the GDP decreased by 37% and industrial output fell by 54%. The country suffered from high and continuing inflation. By mid 1998, the Russian economy was showing signs of recovery, but in August 1998 the country faced a severe financial crisis accompanied by a devaluation of the ruble, default on both domestic and foreign debts, and a collapse of the stock market . For many Russians this crisis was reflected in a considerable real wage decline: -13.3% in 1998 and -22% in 1999 (Goskomstat, 2004) . Since 1999, macroeconomic indicators look better: continuous GDP growth starting in 1999 and growth in real wages and employment (Goskomstat, 2008) .
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The economic crisis seriously impacted the labor market: according to RLMS data, the wage gap between men and women increased significantly during and after the crisis (Gerry et al., 2004 2 ; Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000; Lacroix and Radtchenko, 2008) . Men often moonlighted while women increased their domestic labor supply. These behavioral changes can not only have distributive impacts within households but they can also induce changes in social norms, more specifically a movement away from the emphasis on equal employment of men and women during the communist period 3 . In recent years, a significant proportion of women have withdrawn from the working force to become housewives while at the same time young women have become more active, more inclined to embrace professional careers and more mobile in labor markets.
All these trends inevitably influence intra-household relations and consequently the decision process.
The next section presents the data and discusses some Russian labor market adjustments. Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics of subjective questions and validates the assumptions regarding subjective data. Section 4 introduces two concepts defining intrahousehold equality and consequent econometric applications. Section 5 discusses the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes 4 XV) of data in the second phase of the project. The second phase data were drawn anew from the population and contains approximately 4000 households 4 .
We use first eight rounds of phase II (rounds 5 -12). Our analysis covers the period from 1994 to 2003, a period characterized by massive economic and social changes in Russia.We follow Lacroix and Radtchenko (2008) in considering two major sub-periods of the phase II corresponding to the pre and post financial crisis periods characterized by different economic trends. Figure 1 shows mean values for real wage rates (in 2003 rubles separately for men and women) and household income for working couples (in thousands of rubles). When measuring the wages 5 , we account for such phenomena as moonlighting and the development of informal activities (Foley, 1997; Schneider and Enste, 2000) using the information provided by RLMS about the individual's job (primary, secondary or informal activities).
Moreover, we account for public / private type of working place for primary and secondary jobs: the corresponding question is the following: « Is the government the owner or co-owner of your enterprise or organization? ». According to our data, starting with 68% of working individuals working in firms where the government is the owner or co-owner in 1994, this share diminished to 52% in 2003. The distinction between the private and public sectors is important as the public sector offers low wages (Gimpelson and Lukyanova, 2006) , but, in return, provides greater job security and numerous benefits which are generally not offered by the private sector (Yemtsov et al., 2006) . 4 All necessary information on the RLMS data could be found on the data web site: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms. Only first 13 rounds are available free of charge 5 Russia's transformation into a market economy has given rise to the emergence of specific labor market phenomena such as wage arrears, payment in-kind, compulsory unpaid leave, reduced working hours etc. (Gerry et al, 2004) . Such non-standard labor market institutions as well as an underreporting or non responding of monetary indicators in the data are likely to affect the wage measurement. However, these difficulties were especially acute at the beginning of the transition period and, after 2000, the situation has been improving considerably. By considering the pre and post financial crisis sub-periods, we account for such phenomena in our empirical strategy.
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USING SUBJECTIVE DATA

Subjective well-being: some descriptive statistics
Following the work on poverty initiated by the « Leyden School » in the seventies, subjective data are more and more extensively used in the economic literature, especially in studies about poverty, well-being, satisfaction, or happiness (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004 Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1999; Veenhoven, 1993) . For example, subjective information is used to study individual non monetary costs of unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) or to better understand individual attitudes towards inequalities (Ng, 1996; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000) . This kind of analysis generally provides plausible and reliable empirical results.
Each year the RLMS investigates the distribution of welfare in a qualitative manner.
Spouses are asked to answer the Income Perception Question (1) Our sample is composed of couples in which individuals gave answers to the above questions and provided wage information. To present self-rated income, we collapse the highest ranks (6, 7, 8, and 9) of the ladder into one category: few respondents considered themselves as amongst the richest. hal-00687277, version 1 -13 Apr 2012
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The answers of husbands and wives to both the questions relative to income perception and to utility show a similar pattern. Overall, the descriptive statistics suggests that their differentials can be associated with intra-household inequality, thus providing information on true welfare sharing in the households.
It also suggests that spouses have had to adapt their behavior to a changing economic environment. The behavioral adjustments may reflect not only gender-biased crisis effects, but also a new equilibrium bargaining power within households. Thus, we consider two different periods of time when using the data. To do this, we introduce a dummy variable D which takes a value of 1 for the observations of the post-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and a value of 0 for the pre-crisis period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . In order to allow the parameters to vary with time,
we complete the list of explanatory variables by their products with the dummy D. Thus we introduce two sets of explanatory variables for the empirical analysis throughout the paper:
the coefficients corresponding to one set (D = 0) report the effects in the pre-crisis period; the coefficients corresponding to their products with the dummy provide the markup or markdown with time (D = 1).
Interpreting Answers to the Subjective Questions
We assume throughout the paper that differentials in the answers reflect differentials in the "objective" situation of household members.
First, we assume a direct relationship between the partners' subjective answers and the income they objectively receive within the family on one hand and with their satisfaction level, on the other hand. We interpret a similar answer of the partners as indicating an equal sharing of income in the first case, and of utility in the second case.
Second, our interpretation of the available subjective information implies that the answer to the income perception question refers to household income sharing rather than to individual earned income. to assume that two individuals living together and sharing the same social environment have similar scales when answering subjective questions regarding economic well-being.
Two empirical tests given in the next subsections support our understanding of the nature of the information provided by the subjective questions presented above.
Income or Utility?
We estimate an ordered probit in order to test for a positive relationship between individual indirect utility, as measured by the answers to the satisfaction question (AS, the five steps satisfaction scale), and full income, as measured by the answers to the income question (AI, the nine steps income scale). While a positive relationship does not give a formal proof of the interpretation of AI as representing the shares of full income, it supports such an assumption and gives a direct test of the consistency of the answers to the two subjective questions.
PLACE TABLE 5 HERE Table 5 shows a strong positive relationship between the answers to the income perception and satisfaction questions. Such a result is consistent with the theoretical interpretation (see below section 4): indirect utility function being increasing in income as well as in full income, a positive correlation between the two questions is expected when controlling for demographic variables. Note that the satisfaction scale is also increasing in wages. What can also be noted is the negative sign of children on their parents' satisfaction. This is true for older children (7-18 years) upon their father's satisfaction, and for children of any age upon their mother's satisfaction. These latter strong negative effects are possibly related to the burden of total work (domestic work plus market work), which is very high and shared in a very unequal way (in Russia the total amount of work performed by women is much higher than amount of work performed by their partners, cf. Kalugina, Radtchenko and Sofer, 2008) . As young children add much more work to their mother than to their father, it is not surprising that woman's satisfaction decreases more with the presence of a young child.
Individual or Household Income?
The income question is asked on an individual basis within the individual questionnaire and does not explicitly refer to household income-sharing. However it is placed hal-00687277, version 1 -13 Apr 2012
in the family well-being context. We assume thus that when answering this question, individuals refer to their share of household full income rather than to their individual labor earnings. To validate this assumption we carry out an empirical test which consists in regressing simultaneously the spouses' values of income index AI on their labor incomes along with some individual and household characteristics. The results of the test are obtained using 3SLS and shown in Table 6 . For each spouse, 0  gives the parameter estimate for the before-crisis period, 1  shows how it changes with time; the parameter corresponding to the post-crisis period is thus sum of 0  and 1  .
PLACE TABLE 6 HERE
The data support our assumption. Indeed, if one's reply referred to purely individual labor income, the partner's labor income would not be significant. Both responses are strongly influenced not only by one's own income, but also by one's partner labor income. In general, for both spouses, the impact of one's own income is greater than that of his/her partner income. These findings are consistent with non-unitary approach (see, for example, Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992) and support our interpretation in terms of income sharing.
Indeed, while one's income increase can be benefic to both partners, the one's increasing bargaining power due to increasing of his or her wage benefits stronger one's own income share.
In addition, the test provides a first piece of evidence on the parameter changes between two periods. Indeed, the parameters corresponding to the income effects are in general varying with time: in difference with the pre crisis period, the income effects of both spouses become the same regarding the man's response and the husband's income does not seem to affect the wife's response. This finding is very similar to that found by Lacroix and Radtchenko (2008) : using a collective model of labor supply, they find that in this period, an increase in male wage translates in a smaller transfer to their spouse while an increase in female wage translates in a greater transfer to the husband. These changes are observed when controlling for differences in age and education of the spouses as well as in household composition and region of living.
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MODELLING INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITIES
The distribution of welfare within households is not egalitarian. The results of Let IR and IS be indexes taking values 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether the difference observed between female and male income or satisfaction levels is negative, zero, or positive.
Intra household equality is formalized as follows: 
Such a method allows not to constraint the random effect to follow a particular distribution law. The method is adopted in recent literature on household well being: Michaud and Vermeulen (2006) have recently estimated a discrete-choice collective household labour supply model in which unobserved heterogeneity is modelled in a similar fashion. Lacroix and Radtchenko (2008) have estimated in the same spirit a collective model with corner solutions using the RLMS data.
hal-00687277, version 1 -13 Apr 2012 13 with F standing for the cumulative standard normal distribution function and two types of auxiliary parameters defining the latent variable bounds for each type of households:
RESULTS
The parameter estimates of models (1) and (2) are presented in Table 7 . For each index, the parameter estimates are divided into two columns, depending on whether
 gives the parameter estimate for the pre-crisis period and 1  shows how it changes with time; the parameter corresponding to the post-crisis period is thus the sum of 0  and 1  .
PLACE TABLE 7 HERE Table 7 shows that, for both indexes, wage difference is highly significant. First, this finding supports our hypothesis of a comparability of the answers discussed previously:
indeed, if the appreciation scales of two partners were unrelated, the differentials in answers would not be dependent on wages or on the wage ratio.
Second, the coefficients corresponding to the wage difference has the expected sign:
the higher the woman's wage compared to her husband's, the greater is the probability that the woman's response to the income perception question is higher than her husband's. Wage differences affect satisfaction differentials in the same way. However, the effect is less important for satisfaction than in the case of income. This is not surprising for it can be expected that wages have a stronger impact on income perception than on life satisfaction which also depends on many other variables, such as health, or family relationships. The two different indexes (IS against IR) are of a different nature. Indeed, these findings along with the positive correlation found between individual reported levels in income perception and satisfaction (Table 7) support the hypothesis of a relationship, but not of equivalence, of the two questions. For example, differences in expectations or in "needs" between the two partners will be reflected in the answers to the satisfaction question, more than in the answers to the income perception question. Conversely, the impact of the market determinants is expected to be much lower in the answers to the former than in the answers to the latter.
hal-00687277, version 1 -13 Apr 2012
The monetary nature of the subjective income information is confirmed further by time flexibility of the differentials between the pre and the post 1998 periods. According to Table 7 , the effect of the wage ratio decreased in the post 1998 period while its effect on satisfaction remained relatively stable. The effect of the wage ratio on income perception differentials remains nevertheless significant. The latter result could indicate that given a wage gap, the sharing of monetary resources is probably more equal in after crisis period.
As discussed previously, labor income during transition varied not only with the wage rate but also with the social security system accessible according to state or private status of an enterprise. Then, not only differences in wages but also differences in the job status could affect their satisfaction levels. The dummy variable "Working State Enterprise" indicates whether both spouses work in a state enterprise or not 8 . The negative coefficient of the post-1998 period in the IS estimation shows that women are less satisfied than men when work in a state enterprise in the post-1998 period. This could indicate the lower level of the social security system provided by state enterprises in the post-1998 period 9 , which is likely not to compensate any more for the low wages they offer. Indeed, the supply of public goods by state firms tended to decline after 1998, including facilities for children 10 .
Another variable which influences the distribution of full income and utility among household members is the age difference, i.e. the wife's age minus her husband's age: the older the woman relative to her husband, when the man's age is controlled for, the lower her relative income and satisfaction perception. The effect of the age difference can thus be interpreted as showing the greater bargaining power of women who are relatively younger compared to their husband, all other things being equal.
Labor market liberalization was expected to lead to an increase in the returns to schooling over the transition period. Several studies (for the review cf. Flabbi et al, 2007) suggest that the largest increase in returns to education took place during the early transition (around the early 1990s) with returns to schooling higher for women than for men (Fleisher et al., 2004) . Our results show that women having a higher degree of education than men 11 used 8 In our estimation sample we have 47% of households where two spouses work in the firm owned or co-owned by the government. This share has been decreasing during the analyzed period from 54% of such households in 1994 to 39% in 2003. 9 The detailed analysis of monetary and non monetary benefits proposed by the private and public sectors is given in Radtchenko (2006) . 10 According to our data the sharp decline of some social benefits within firms (free treatment in a department medical institute, free or partial payment of sanatoria, free childcare in a departmental preschool) was observed between 2002 and 2003. The trend is true for both public and private enterprises. 11 Newell, Reilly (1997) and Gerry et al. (2004) show the advantages of using a set of educational qualification in place of years of education in transitional economies. We follow the same approach when introducing education differences.
to gain in intra-household income distribution in the pre 1998 period. This positive effect cancels after the crisis. On the other hand, conversely, the after crisis period shows a positive effect of women's higher educational level on satisfaction differential. As a whole, the results seem to indicate that an increase in the educational level relative to one's partner increases one's negotiation power. The same result is obtained in Kalugina, Radtchenko, Sofer (2009) .
A significant effect of age and education differences was also found in Bonke and Browning, 2003 . (see also Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993 However, families with retired persons are not the most vulnerable in terms of poverty comparing to those with children or single retired persons (Ovcharova, 2005) .
The differences in the partners' income levels vary across regions. In North, Ural and Western Siberia women are more likely to report higher income level than men. This may be due to the interregional differentials in real income, wage and unemployment rates. Indeed, Russia being a huge country, the cost of living varies strongly from one region to another and these differentials are not decreasing over time (Andrienko and Guriev, 2003) According to the IR parameter estimates, unobserved heterogeneity does not appear to be a very important factor in determining intra-household distribution of income: by far, the second type with superior bounds k 1 and k 2 presents a probability of 87%. It means that, there is possibly a small group of households (with a probability of only 13%) where women are somehow more optimistic or the men are more pessimistic as compared to the other group.
One can thus conclude that the control variables, in particular wage rates, capture a sizable amount of individual heterogeneity.
14 Andrienko and Guriev (2003) report the following data concerning regional inequalities in Russia. Unemployment rate (ILO definition) in 1994 varied from 4.6 to 18% and from 5.6% to 51.8% in 1999. The same trend is observed for real income per capita as number of 25-product baskets that the regional monthly income can buy: from 1.7 to 7.6 in 1994 and from 1.5 to 14.3 in 1999.
Contrarily to the IR estimation, IS estimation shows a more important division of the population. One can conjecture that due to some unobserved effects, there are households (with a 44% probability) where women give systematically inferior answers relative to men as compared to the rest of population. While the auxiliary parameters for two groups are not statistically significant, the null assumption of joint nullity of the parameters is rejected by a likelihood ratio test (
These results show once again that the differentials in the answers to the income perception question are more linked to measurable monetary variables while those to the satisfaction question contain more psychological or cultural elements. Allowing the bounds to vary with unobserved characteristics we thus take into account possible bias in the scales of two spouses.
The dummy variable Post-1998 (D) indicates that with time the bounds corresponding to the IR estimation derive towards the inferior values. This finding could suggest that in general, given the same observables, the income distribution became more profitable for men than for women in the post-1998 period. The coefficient is not statistically significant, though.
On the other hand, a positive (significant) effect of the dummy in IS estimation can suggest that better economic conditions bring more satisfaction to women than to men in the post-1998 period.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
The paper proposes an original strategy to infer household sharing of income and satisfaction. Starting with the collective model of labor supply we exploit a unique dataset drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to tract empirically two concepts of intrahousehold inequality defined either as equal sharing of the total household income or equal utility distribution.
Using two different subjective questions of the Russian data RLMS (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey), we assume a correspondence between, first, the perception of income that household members report and their true income sharing, and, second, between their answer to a satisfaction question and their utility. We find a positive correlation between the scales of two questions when controlling for demographic variables. Both scales are found to be increasing in wages. The results support thus the basic assumptions and provide hal-00687277, version 1 -13 Apr 2012 empirical evidence to the consistency of the interpretation of the two answers given to the subjective questions.
The main findings of the empirical analysis are in accordance with the predictions of the collective model or more generally a non-unitary model defining household members' allocations as the result of a bargaining process. Indeed, we find that wage and age differentials at the household level do affect individual income shares. The higher the husband to wife wage ratio, the more likely her share of the total revenue or utility welfare is elevated.
In the case of the unitary model of household behavior, the total individual income is unaffected by the relative wage rates or age difference and self-reported levels would be random.
The intra household welfare distribution is analyzed in its dynamics during the transitional period in Russia. The changes in intra-household decision process induced by massive economic and social changes, in particular by labor market adjustments, are recovered from the observed individual characteristics and behavioral changes. We exploit the episode of the financial crisis of 1998 to distinguish two periods, that is pre and post crisis.
We find that in the 2000-2003 period, as the economy got better, the sharing of monetary resources is more equal than previously and that better economic conditions bring more satisfaction to women then to men. 
R12 (2003) Nb ( Sample: couples where two members answered the subjective question and their salaries are known 0-there is no difference between husband's and wife's responses. -1 -the wife is situated one step lower than her spouse. -2 -the wife is situated 2 or more steps lower than her spouse. 1-the wife is situated one step higher than her spouse. 2 -the wife is situated 2 or more steps higher than her spouse. Prob. > χ 2 0.000 0.000 * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level Source: RLMS (rounds 5-13) 
